

became independent or not.

At the Cairo Conference, however, the far-sighted leaders of the three great Powers of the United Nations --- the United States of America, Great Britain, and the Republic of China --- made the statesmenlike decision that Korea “should be free and independent in due course.” When this news was reported all Koreans in and outside Korea, especially all Korean revolutionists who have been ceaselessly struggling during the past thirty to forty years for the restoration of their nation’s freedom and independence, rejoiced and felt grateful toward the three eminent leaders, President Roosevelt, President Chiang Kai-shek, and Prime Minister Churchill.

Without entering upon an analysis or discussion *pro* or *con* of the phrase “in due course,” the purpose here is merely to outline briefly in what way Korea’s role can be made show that thirty million Koreans with inborn hatred for Japanese oppressors, if properly utilized can be a tremendous asset to the cause of the United Nations. Such utilization will mean, when the great offensive drive will sweep over the mainland of Eastern Asia , the saving of scores of thousands of lives of Americans and Britons , not to speak of the decidedly added strength it will be valiant Chinese combat forces.

## I. ACTUAL POTENTIALITIES

Aside from a few thousand men scattered here and there, mainly of the Korean Restoration Army (Known in Chinese as Kwang Fu Chun) and some twenty odd small groups at the various fronts in North China and Central China, including points in the provinces of Hopeh and the borders of Jehol, Honan, Shansi, Shantung, Anhwei, Hupeh, and Kiangsi, the present Korean combat force may be to an outsider considered almost negligible. Yet many of them engaged in armed liaison operations at the battle-fronts and in the enemy’s rear have rendered and are still rendering most valuable service to both regular

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and mobile units of China. These few thousand, many of them train officers, can certainly serve as a vital nucleus for a large combat force to be organized, trained and equipped.

In the occupied areas south of Shanhaikwan, including Shanghai, Nanking and adjacent regions, Shantung and Shansi with the main points like Chinan, Tsingtao,

Shigkiacgwang, Taiyuen, and other place along the Tientsin-Pukow and Peiping-Hankow railways, in and near Peiping and Tientsin, embracing Kalgan and Suiyuen, there are approximately some 600,000 Koreans ( men, women, old and yorng). AS a starter from these alone a fair-sized army could be recruited. By accelerating the extension of underground liaison work into Manchuria a much larger force could be mustered out from that region where, it is now said, there are some 3,000,000 Koreans. The latest report mentions that in the foot-hills of Chanpeh Shan (the Everwhite Mountains ) there are still about 3,000 Koreans fighting conjointly with the Chinese guerrillas against the Japanese. These would eventually constitute another nucleus for a still larger force to be recruited and organized from that contingent. Also in the Russian Turkistan, Siberia, and elsewhere in Soviet Russia, there are some 300,000 or more Koreans, many of whom are experienced fighters and are also very anxious to join the Korean Movement. By proper negotiation with the Soviet authorities, perhaps sponsored by one or two of the other Allied Powers, quite a number could be recruited from this quarter. All these may serve to show the potentiality in manpower alone. With proper planning and adequate means, one may say that within a reasonable length of time one may be sure of forming, training and equipping an efficient and quite considerable Korean fighting force.

As to immediate operations, however, stress may be laid on extension and intensification of the liaison work at the various fronts and behind the enemy lines, in Manchuria and Korea as well, and the organizing of a more thoroughly efficient network of underground communication and intelligence operations, so as to expedite and facilitate the recruiting work as well as the work of harassing the enemy and effecting the come-over *en bloc* of the many Koreans in the enemy service, either voluntary or compulsory. The essential value of these features of our war effort need not developed here in detail.

## II. WHY THE KOREAN PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED

Without going into history or an analytic observation of the merits and demerits of the Korean Provisional Government, suffice it here to present concisely the reasons why it should be now recognized by the interested Powers. In the light of following several points it may be evident that recognition of the Korean Provisional Government is not only beneficial but *strategically essential* to the Allied Powers.

1. It cannot be denied that affair- sized, well-organized, thoroughly trained and properly equipped Korean Independence Army will be of tremendously strategic advantage to the United Nations. To utilize to the full this advantage there must be not only the requisite material factors but also the proper agency through which the final objectives can be reached. The Korean Provisional Government, whatever its short comings, is the only body that can be so employed.

2. The Korean Provisional Government was created at the time of Korea's nation-wide revolutionary uprising in 1919 by the congress of representatives of the thirteen provinces. Unable to function even secretly under the Japanese military espionage and brutality the provincial representatives escaped to Shanghai and there with only one or two changes reorganized the same Government. This Provisional Government is a democratic form of government representing the Republic of Korea as proclaimed by the signatories of the famous Declaration of Independence on March 1, 1919. This Provisional Government has carried on since, uninterruptedly for twenty-six long years, as the sole directorate of the Korean Independence Movement. At no time and in no place, either within or outside Korea, has there ever been any other Korean provisional government or even a similar body claiming to direct the entire Korean Independence Movement. If the existence of a Korean movement for national liberation, with its history of incessant struggle for more than a quarter of a

century is to conceded, one cannot ignore the existence and the true status of the Korean Provisional government.

3. This Korean Provisional government is the only body of agency that can muster and direct the various forces overseas of the entire Korean Independence Movement. Likewise, when the time and preparations are ripe, it is the one instrument that can light the fuse to volcanic upheaval within the land.

4. Recognition of the Korean Provisional government will immediately cement the various revolutionary forces within and outside Korea into a fighting mass and will decidedly expedite the positive efforts of all Korean patriots to get in step quickly with the

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Allied armies' march in driving out the common fascist foe from China proper, from the Manchurian plains, and from the Korean peninsula. It will directly assist to the greatest advantage the actually combined drive.

5. On the other hand it will forestall any attempt on the part of the cunning Japanese to set-up perhaps a "Quisling" independence government or some such contraption in Korea as they have done in the Philippines, Malasia, Indo-China, etc.

6. Base on its democratic principles, the Provisional government will, as clearly set forth in the Provisional Constitution from the very beginning and constantly reiterated, within one year after entering the homeland convoke a National Representative Assembly to adopt a permanent constitution and thereupon to elect a permanent official government. But of course it is almost certain that such a National Representative Assembly will take the present Provisional Constitution and this Provisional Government as the foundation upon which to build the permanent structure.

7. Hence the Koreans are asking the United Nations to recognize this Korean Provisional Government at least simply as it is, a *provisional* government. Such recognition naturally implies no permanency but a temporary and strategic politic nature.

8. The main object of the Koreans is not recognition for recognition's sake but the

positive establishment of the necessary official contact with the leading Powers of the United Nations—China, the United States of America, Great Britain, and Soviet Russia——so that Koreans also can quickly join in the effectively and positively in the combined effort to down the common fascist enemy in the Far East and to co-operate in the postwar planning for the establishment of permanent peace in Far East and in the world.

9. Koreans by themselves have not the wherewithal to recruit even and to organize, train and equip an adequate armed force to fight a lone battle against Japan. Hence official contact with the interested Powers is of first necessity to devise together ways and means of taking the best advantage of existing circumstances. We cannot ask for the application of the lend-lease act without properly recognized status. If *de jure* recognition should be considered be considered inexpedient or absolutely impossible at present, even *de facto* recognition might be to the purpose.

10. Koreans are grateful to China's Kuomintang for what assistance it is giving this Provisional government self-exiled now in Chungking, but Koreans are not begging for mere existence or livelihood. Koreans want to fight the Japanese, side by side the Chinese, American, British, or any other armies in crushing the common foe, and thereby hope ultimately to liberate their own nation from the clutches of the foe.

11. Up till now one or two of the interested Powers may have been hesitant to recognize the Korean Provisional government for two reasons One was the fear that the Koreans were not united, the other was that perhaps previous agreement among the leading Powers was considered necessary. Now the first cause of hesitation has been removed, as recognized by most of our outside friends themselves, since we have recently effected this long-awaited unification by consolidating all our political groups and parties in reorganizing the Provisional government. The second difficulty could be overcome, if overtures could somehow be made by any one of the Powers.

12. By their inborn hatred of the foe in question, by many affinities in tradition and habits, By their thorough understanding of the Japanese psychology, by their deftness in the mastery of the language, and by many other intricate ways Koreans are uniquely fitted to serve as one of the, if not the, principal forces in downing the common enemy. There are many an important phase of the war effort against Japan which Koreans alone can undertake as no others can even make the attempt.

In the light of these few outstanding facts and truths it is hoped that the Powers

concerned will no longer look lightly upon : this all-important part of the present combined efforts against the common fascist foe in the Far East. From whatever angle or in whatever concerned, who have taken upon themselves the responsibility of conducting this world-wide struggle against the evil forces of Fascism, should consider themselves gravely responsible whether they do or not follow to the fullest advantage such a clear and natural course. When time is too late the responsibility of omission may be seen to be just as great as that of commission. Koreans consider the far-sighted statesmen of America and England may be the first to realize these points and the first to act themselves and influence others in guiding this war-torn world into the path of peace and happiness for all.

Chunhking , China.

June 10 , 1944.